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Abstract 
Scholars have acknowledged that the study of World War II era intelligence can be an 
extremely arduous undertaking. Intelligence tradecraft, by its very nature, requires that 
certain information remain secret. It necessitates the sustained concealment of activities 
or events. Moreover, this government emphasis on secrecy often results in the 
suppression of sensitive information from historians and citizens alike. Thus, one must 
turn to declassified records of the past to reshape modern conceptions of history. This 
article should be regarded as a spirited departure from traditional scholarship. 
Specifically, it utilizes the case study method to communicate a powerful message 
related to both law and history. Readers are encouraged to examine this narrative and 
related analysis in conjunction with the primary source material it references. More 
importantly, they are asked to apply a socio-legal approach to the personal account 
contained therein. In the summer of 2011, the author was fortunate to discover a 
declassified report detailing his grandfather’s experiences as a young airman in World 
War II. Lt. Raymond Murphy was shot down in 1944 by German anti-aircraft fire on his 
sixteenth mission as a B-17 Navigator with the U.S. Army Air Corps. When examined 
from a legal perspective, his report is illustrative of a number of law of war topics, 
including the foundational principles that gave rise to modern humanitarian law. 
Unfortunately, Lt. Murphy's account also evidences something far more disturbing, a 
criminal atrocity committed by German forces against the French population. 
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Over half a century after the Nazi era, the U.S. Government continues to keep 
secret much of the information it has on Nazi war criminals. It is imperative that 
this information receive full scrutiny by the public. Only through an informed 
understanding of the Nazi era and its aftermath can we guard against a repeat of 
one of the darkest moments in history.2  
Rep. Stephen Horn, July 1998 
 
Introduction 
The Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998 required the U.S. Government to expedite the 
release of classified intelligence information related to German war crimes committed during 
World War II.3 In an effort to fulfill this mandate, an interagency working group was called upon 
to ‘locate, identify, recommend for declassification, and make available to the public at the 
National Archives and Records Administration, all classified Nazi war criminal records of the 
United States.’4 This working group would ultimately release over 8.5 million pages from 
documents ‘scattered among the vast quantities of files stored in the national archives and 
individual federal agencies.’5 As a result, this project would come to be regarded as the ‘largest 
congressionally mandated declassification effort in history.’6 Although members of Congress 
were successful in initiating an unprecedented release of information,7 their efforts are notable 
for another reason as well - America’s lawmakers failed to allocate funds for the continued 
research and preservation of this material.8 Rather, they left this substantial responsibility to 
inquisitive historians and members of the general public.9  
                                                          
2
 Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act: Hearing on H.R. 4007 and S. 1379 Before the Subcommittee on 
Government Management, Information, and Technology of the House Committee on Government Reform 
and Oversight, Statement of Representative Stephen Horn, Chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Government Management, Information, and Technology (105
th
 Congress, 1998) p.1.  
3
 Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act 1998 codified as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 522 note. 
4
 Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act § 2(c)(1). See also Nazi War Criminal Records Interagency Working 
Group, Implementation of Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act: An Interim Report to Congress (1999).   
5
 Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, Final 
Report to Congress (2007) pp.1 and 5.     
6
 Working Group, Final Report pp.xv and 1. 
7
 Statement of Rep. Stephen Horn p.1 describing congressional intent behind the Nazi War Crimes 
Disclosure Act of 1998.   
8
 Implementation of the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on 
Government Management, Information, and Technology of the House Committee on Government Reform 
and Oversight, Statement of Dr. Michael Katz, Assistant Archivist of the United States National Archives 
and Records Administration (106
th
 Congress, 2000).    
9
 Statement of Dr. Katz p.15. See also Final Report pp.1-2 clarifying that agency participants did not 
receive independent funding for the prolonged study of these documents - rather, their mandate was to 
release these records to the general public.     
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Scholars have acknowledged that the study of World War II era intelligence can be an extremely 
arduous undertaking.10 Intelligence tradecraft, by its very nature, requires that certain 
information remain secret.11 It necessitates the sustained concealment of activities and events.12 
Moreover, this government emphasis on secrecy often results in the suppression of sensitive 
information from historians and citizens alike.13 Thus, it has ‘become a tradition in intelligence 
scholarship to look to the declassified records of the past for enlightenment.’14 This trend has 
led multiple historians to conclude that ‘there are remarkable fragments of the story which have 
lain undiscovered in improbable places for more than fifty years.’15 Consequently, those 
choosing to carry out archival research ‘will undoubtedly find their own discoveries in these 
declassified documents and in related records of the National Archives.’16      
 
This article should be regarded as a spirited departure from traditional legal scholarship. It 
endeavours to be a ‘largely empirical contribution to the start of a wider project’17 - namely, one 
that examines fragments of declassified intelligence and attempts to place this information into a 
larger mosaic of historical events.18 The following discussion utilizes the case study method to 
communicate a powerful message related to both law and history. Readers are encouraged to 
examine this narrative and related analysis in conjunction with the primary source material it 
references. More importantly, they are asked to evaluate relevant provisions of international law 
and to apply these principles to a specific declassified report. It is through a similar process that 
this article arrives at its central conclusion.  
                                                          
10
 Richard Breitman et al., U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis (Cambridge University Press, 2005) p.8; 
Richard Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, American, and Cold War Secret Intelligence (The Overlook 
Press, 2001) p.16.    
11
 Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (CQ Press, 2009) p.1; John Radsan, ‘The 
Unresolved Equation of Espionage and International Law,’ Michigan Journal of International Law, 28 
(2007) 595-623, pp.599-602.    
12
 See Lowenthal, Intelligence p.1.   
13
 Lowenthal, Intelligence p.1 explaining that secrecy can be a source of consternation to private citizens, 
especially in a democratic society such as the United States.   
14
 Lorie Charlesworth, ‘2 SAS Regiment, War Crimes Investigations, and British Intelligence: Intelligence 
Officials and the Natzweiler Trial,’ Journal of Intelligence History, 6 (2006) 13-60, p.21.    
15
 Aldrich, Hidden Hand p.15. See also Breitman, U.S. Intelligence p.8; Michael Salter, Nazi War Crimes, 
U.S. Intelligence and Selective Prosecution at Nuremburg: Controversies Regarding the Role of the 
Office of Strategic Services (Taylor & Francis, 2007) pp.2-3.   
16
 Breitman, U.S. Intelligence p.8.   
17
 Salter, Nazi War Crimes p.4.   
18
 Aldrich, Hidden Hand pp.15-16 discussing the inherent difficulty in researching events that are recorded 
in documents scattered across various archival collections. See also Charlesworth, ‘2 SAS,’ p.21 
comparing the study of declassified intelligence to assembling a larger mosaic of historical information.  
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1 Background 
There is little doubt that memory is an essential concept for historians.19 In their search for ‘the 
“truth” of remembered account’, scholars often turn to the case study method to ‘record and 
value’ historical events.20 In his recent work related to postwar intelligence, Michael Salter 
emphasizes the importance of the case study in placing declassified intelligence into its broader 
historical context.21 Specifically, he suggests that ‘detailed case studies can be as revealing of 
wider historical and institutional tendencies as apparently broader sociological approaches that 
seek to capture and generalize about the entire field.’22 As Salter’s viewpoints have gained 
acceptance amongst prominent academic circles, a new legal sub-discipline has started to 
emerge. 
 
Socio-legal analysis is described as a ‘fluid, changing, open movement [that] defies a fixed 
descriptor’.23 At its core, however, this approach focuses on the intersection of law, intelligence, 
and human rights.24 Proponents of this movement stress that it explores historical events ‘from 
the perspective of the various participants, emphasizing their “lived experience.”’25 As a result, 
some scholars have asserted that this legal sub-discipline ‘encourages the voice of the historian 
to be heard directly in the text’, thereby making remembered account an integral piece of the 
ensuing narrative.26 Thus, readers should be aware that throughout the remainder of this article, 
‘the authorial voice, my voice, disrupts this narrative… to allow other interpretations to emerge 
and to sabotage illusions of closure.’27 This was done deliberately and in an effort to familiarize 
the audience with the case study that follows.      
                                                          
19
 Lorie Charlesworth, ‘Forgotten Justice: Forgetting Law’s History and Victim’s Justice in British “Minor” 
War Crimes Trials 1945-48,’ Amicus Curiae, 74 (2008) 2-10, p.2.    
20
 Charlesworth, ‘Forgotten Justice,’ p.4.   
21
 Salter, Nazi War Crimes p.3. See also Michael Salter, ‘Intelligence Agencies and War Crimes 
Prosecution: Allen Dulles’s Involvement in Witness Testimony at Nuremberg,’ Journal of International 
Criminal Justice, 2 (2004) 826-854, p.826 describing CIA Director Allen Dulles’s involvement in the 
Nuremberg proceedings; Michael Salter, ‘Trial by Media: The Psychological Warfare Background to 
OSS’s Contribution to the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials,’ Journal of Intelligence History, 9 (2010) 15-51, 
p.15 analyzing the role of the Office of Strategic Services in the Nuremberg proceedings; Michael Salter 
et al., ‘War Crimes Prosecutors and Intelligence Agencies: The Case for Assessing their Collaboration,’ 
Intelligence and National Security, 16 (2001) 93-120, p.93 providing additional discussion of the 
involvement of intelligence agencies in monitoring war criminality.   
22
 Salter, Nazi War Crimes p.3.   
23
 Charlesworth, ‘Forgotten Justice,’ p.3.   
24
 See Charlesworth, ‘Forgotten Justice,’ p.3 referencing socio-legal studies in the context of Salter’s 
emphasis on intelligence studies and humanitarian scholarship.   
25
 Charlesworth, ‘Forgotten Justice,’ p.3.   
26
 Charlesworth, ‘Forgotten Justice,’ p.4. 
27
 Charlesworth, ‘Forgotten Justice,’ p.4. 
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In the summer of 2011, through hard work and a bit of luck, my father and I were able to learn 
more about the man who made our very existence possible, Lt. Raymond Murphy. The task of 
locating my grandfather was complicated by a number of factors, not the least of which was his 
misrepresenting his age by one year to join the U.S. Army Air Corps in 1942. In addition, my 
father never met his birth father and knew few particulars of the man’s life. Although my 
grandfather passed away in 1970 at the age of 46, we were fortunate to discover a series of 
documents detailing his experiences during World War II.28 Moreover, our journey led us to his 
final resting place at Arlington National Cemetery.     
 
Although the details that led to this discovery are certainly noteworthy, this article seeks to 
examine something much more significant - the story my grandfather was able to share with us 
nearly 40 years after his death. On 28 April 1944, Lt. Murphy was shot down by German anti-
aircraft fire over Avord, France on his sixteenth mission as a B-17 Navigator with the 91st Bomb 
Group, 324th Squadron.29 For the next three months, he successfully evaded German patrols 
and Nazi collaborators with the help of local French Resistance fighters known as le Maquis.30   
 
Following his escape in August of 1944, my grandfather was questioned by the U.S. Army 
Military Intelligence Service at Headquarters, European Theater of Operations.31 The 
information he provided during his debriefing was recorded in narrative form and analysed for 
intelligence related to the continued presence of German forces in occupied France. At the 
conclusion of his interview, my grandfather signed a security certificate forbidding him from 
                                                          
28
 The information in this article is primarily drawn from Missing Air Crew Report (MACR) No. 4235 and 
Escape and Evasion Report (E&E) No. 866. During World War II, U.S. Army Air Corps Bomb Groups 
were required to submit MACRs when airmen were lost during combat operations. E&E Reports were 
required when personnel subsequently avoided capture by enemy forces. Notably, the National Archives 
and Records Administration recently made E&E reports publicly available in electronic format. Thus, the 
primary source material contained in MACR No. 4235 and E&E No. 866 should be examined in 
conjunction with this article. Please see relevant citations and associated hyperlinks to access publicly 
available versions of these documents.       
29
 See generally Escape and Evasion Report No. 866, Evasion in France (15 Aug 1944), 
http://media.nara.gov/nw/305270/EE-866.pdf?bcsi_scan_0F6519961A220080=0&bcsi_scan_filename= 
EE-866.pdf.   
30
 E&E No. 866, pp.1-23. See also Julian Jackson, France: The Dark Years 1940-1944 (Oxford University 
Press, 2001); Claude Chambard, The Maquis: A History of the French Resistance Movement (Macmillan 
General Reference, 1976) providing a more thorough discussion of French Resistance efforts and the 
structure of le Maquis generally.   
31
 E&E No. 866, p.1. See also Charlesworth, ‘2 SAS Regiment,’ p.13 demonstrating that intelligence 
collection played a critical role in post-War proceedings such as the Nuremberg Trials and other minor 
war crimes trials.     
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disclosing any facts related to his wartime experience.32 The resulting report was marked 
‘SECRET’ and titled Escape and Evasion Report No. 866, Evasion in France.33 Only recently 
has this document been made available to the public in electronic format.34   
 
Although my father and I will never be able to sit down with Lt. Murphy and discuss his story, his 
words are compelling even 40 years after his death. As a scholar of intelligence law and history, 
I was struck by the significance of his experiences in the summer of 1944. When examined from 
a legal perspective, his declassified first person account is illustrative of a number of law of war 
topics, including the law related to land and aerial warfare, escape and evasion, and the duties 
owed to inhabitants during belligerent occupation. Most notably, however, my grandfather’s 
report also evidences criminal atrocities committed by German soldiers.   
 
The story told by Lt. Murphy is one of great valor and sacrifice. Accordingly, this article will 
attempt to honour his memory while also providing a thorough legal analysis of the conduct that 
he witnessed. The following discussion will examine his experiences in the context of the law of 
war as it existed in 1944. It will also provide a modern perspective of how this body of law has 
evolved since World War II. In addition, this article will examine a particularly disturbing 
recollection reported by my grandfather to military intelligence officers and attempt to answer 
one important question - could the terrible event described in Escape and Evasion Report No. 
866 constitute evidence of a long-forgotten war crime?35   
 
 
 
                                                          
32
 E&E No. 866, p.21.     
33
 E&E No. 866, p.21. According to the National Archives, E&E Reports were developed to collect and 
evaluate data on escape and evasion activities in the European Theater of Operations. They included a 
brief questionnaire as well as a typed or handwritten narrative provided by the escapee or evader. 
Notably, these reports were not intended to collect information on war crimes or other criminal acts 
perpetrated by enemy forces.           
34
 National Archives, NARAtions: The Blog of the United States National Archives, World War II Escape 
and Evasion Reports Are Now Available Online (14 Sept 2010), http://blogs.archives.gov/online-public-
access/?p=2751 stating that digitized versions of Escape and Evasion Reports first became available on 
NARA’s website in September 2010; see also National Archives, Prologue: Pieces of History, 
http://blogs.archives.gov/prologue/?p=1798.   
35
 See Leslie C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict (Juris Publishing, 2008) pp.50 and 320; 
Salter, Nazi War Crimes p.6 illustrating that under Article 6 of the London Charter of 1945, the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was given jurisdiction over crimes against peace, war crimes, 
and crimes against humanity - although crimes against peace and humanity had never been previously 
defined under international law, these terms were given broad application under these proceedings.     
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2 The Law of War in Historical Perspective 
In order to analyse Lt. Murphy’s account, it is first necessary to provide some context to the war 
as it existed in the skies over Europe during this period. The experiences of my grandfather and 
the crew of his B-17 were in no way unique or exceptional. Rather, all airmen in the U.S. Eighth 
Air Force, or the Mighty Eighth as it was often referred to, took part in fierce aerial combat in the 
period leading up to the summer of 1944.36 One aircrew in particular, the crew of the Memphis 
Belle, made my grandfather’s squadron famous when they were the first to successfully 
complete 25 missions and return to America as celebrated heroes.37   
 
The air war had raged in Europe ‘for two years by the time elements of the Eighth Air Force 
began to arrive in late 1942 and deploy across the misty English countryside.’38 As the conflict 
wound on, the air war ‘kept on creating and re-creating itself in a furious upward curve, 
attackers and defenders alike improvising tactics on a round-the-clock basis, ransacking 
science and engineering for new technology, any kind of edge - new bomber specs and new 
fighter-plane wrinkles… ever-higher ranges in antiaircraft fire’.39 In addition, the Eighth Air 
Force’s mission in Europe was made all the more deadly by one major factor - daytime bombing 
missions.40 
The American forces had committed themselves to daylight bombing, against the 
advice of their British counterparts, who considered it suicidal and had long since 
switched to nighttime bombing. The Eighth still held to the theory that a tight 
formation or a combat box, of B-17 Flying Fortresses, each bristling with guns, 
was capable of defending itself from enemy fighter aircraft. And the Eighth was 
finding that this was a mistake.41        
The losses suffered by the Eighth Air Force were staggering. During the European Campaign, 
more than 30,000 U.S airmen were killed or missing and another 30,000 were captured as 
                                                          
36
 Roger Freeman, The Mighty Eighth: A History of the Units, Men, and Machines of the US Eighth Air 
Force (Doubleday, 1970); Marion Havelaar, The 91
st
 Bombardment Group in World War II (Schiffer, 
1995). See also Rob Morris, Untold Valor: Forgotten Stories of American Bomber Crews in World War II 
(Potomac Books, 2006) detailing personal accounts of airmen from the 8th Air Force during World War II.  
37
 Robert Morgan et al., The Man Who Flew the Memphis Belle: Memoir of a World War II Bomber Pilot 
(Dutton, 2001).   
38
 Morgan, Memphis Belle p.102. See also Havelaar, 91
st
 Bomb Group p.9 describing the arrival and 
deployment of the 8th Air Force in 1942.   
39
 Morgan, Memphis Belle p.102.   
40
 See John Keegan, The Second World War (Penguin Books, 1989) pp.425-26; see also David Metz, 
The Air Campaign: John Warden and the Classical Air Power Theorists (University Press of the Pacific, 
2005) p.39 describing daylight bombing and the theoretical underpinnings for this wartime practice.       
41
 Morris, Untold Valor p.54.   
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prisoners of war.42 Overall, the Eighth Air Force ‘took more casualties in World War II than the 
Marine Corps and the Navy combined.’43 Of the 36 bombers that had originally crossed the 
Atlantic to form the 91st Bomb Group, ‘twenty-nine had been shot down, a casualty rate of 82 
per cent.’44 
 
As a result of the alarming rate of casualties, many survivors were troubled by the memories of 
friends and acquaintances who, just the day before, had been drinking next to them in a pub in 
England.45 Although some men chose to talk openly about their experiences, others suffered in 
silence.46 All airmen, however, speculated about what happened to those who were able to 
escape their crippled aircraft and survive their rapid descent to German occupied territory.47 
Robert Morgan, the pilot of the Memphis Belle, reflected on these men when he wrote:  
We knew every time we went up, that it was very possible, likely even, to get hit 
hard, maybe knocked out of the sky. We might get trapped and roasted at our 
stations, or riddled with flak or machine gun bullets, or captured and sent to 
prison camps if we bailed out, provided we survived the trip down.48 
From 25,000 feet, the conflict below may have seemed somewhat impersonal or distant at 
times. When an airman found himself in the unfortunate situation of being shot down, however, 
the deadly reality of the situation quickly became apparent.49 Rather than returning to base to 
enjoy a hot meal and shower, men like Lt. Murphy and his crew members were forced to come 
face to face with the ground truth of land warfare.   
 
                                                          
42
 Morgan, Memphis Belle p.106. See also Freeman, Mighty Eighth p.35; Havelaar, 91
st
 Bomb Group p.35 
providing more specific casualty reporting for the 8th Air Force and 91st Bomb Group.   
43
 Morgan, Memphis Belle p.106.    
44
 Morgan, Memphis Belle p.132. 
45
 Morgan, Memphis Belle p.132-33; see also Travis Ayres, The Bomber Boys: Heroes Who Flew the B-
17s in World War II (NAL Caliber, 2005); Bert Stiles, Serenade to the Big Bird (Schiffer, 2001) p.69 
detailing personal accounts of airmen who served in World War II.   
46
 Morgan, Memphis Belle p.133. 
47
 See Kay Sloan, Not Without Honor: The Nazi Journal of Steve Carano (University of Arkansas Press, 
2008) p.129 providing Bill Blackmon’s personal account of the events of 28 April 1944 — notably, 
Blackmon spent months in German captivity after his B-17 was shot down during the bombing run on 
Avord, France. See also Stuart Hadaway, Missing Believed Killed: Casualty Policy and the Missing 
Research Service and Enquiry Service 1939-1952 (Pen and Sword, 2008) describing the search for 
missing Allied airmen in Europe.          
48
 Morgan, Memphis Belle p.165.    
49
 Sloan, Not Without Honor p.136. See also Thomas Childers, In the Shadows of War: An American 
Pilot’s Odyssey through Occupied France and the Camps of Nazi Germany (Henry Holt and Company, 
2002).   
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In 1944, the law of land warfare was primarily regulated by the 1907 Hague Convention IV 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV).50 The precursor to Hague IV 
was the 1899 Hague Convention II (Hague II).51 Although Hague II represented the ‘first 
successful effort of the international community to codify a relatively comprehensive regime 
governing the laws of land warfare’,52 the treaty provisions agreed upon by the parties to Hague 
IV are still in force today.53   
 
Parties to both Hague II and Hague IV laid the foundation for what would become known as jus 
in bello, or ‘the laws and customs of war’.54 Notably, the Preamble to Hague IV also gave 
expression to certain ‘high ideals’ which formed the basis for modern humanitarian law.55 The 
Preamble reads in part: 
Animated by the desire to serve, even in this extreme case, the interests of 
humanity and the ever progressive needs of civilization; [t]hinking it important, 
with this object, to revise the general laws and customs of war… the high 
contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included by the 
Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and belligerents remain under the 
protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from 
the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and 
the dictates of the public conscience.56 
This section of Hague IV, which would come to be known as the Martens Clause, makes a clear 
distinction between the ‘laws’ versus the ‘customs’ of war.57 Thus, while Hague IV represented a 
                                                          
50
 See Michael Schmitt, ‘Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: Preserving 
the Delicate Balance,’ Virginia Journal of International Law, 50 (2010) 795-839, pp.795, 800, and 806; 
Chris Jochnick et al., ‘The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War,’ Harvard Journal 
of International Law, 35 (1994) 49-97, pp.49 and 52. 
51
 See Adam Roberts et al., Documents on the Laws of War (Oxford University Press, 2000) pp.67 and 
68. See also Kevin Chamberlain, War and Cultural Heritage (Institute of Art and Law, 2004) p.9.  
52
 Green, Law of Armed Conflict p.41.  
53
 Fritz Kalshoven et al., Constraints on the Waging of War: An Introduction to International Humanitarian 
Law (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2001) p.23. 
54
 Green, Law of Armed Conflict p.22. See also Robert Sloane, ‘The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the 
Dualism of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War,’ Yale Journal of International 
Law, 34 (2009) 47-112, pp.47 and 49; Carsten Stahn, ‘”Jus ad bellum”, “jus in bello” . . . “jus post 
bellum”? – Rethinking the Conception of Law of Armed Force,’ European Journal of International Law, 17 
(2006) 921-943, pp.921 and 925.   
55
 Green, Law of Armed Conflict p.22 and 23.  
56
 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV) (18 Oct 1907) Preamble.   
57
 Roberts et al., Documents on the Laws of War p.68. See also Thedor Meron, ‘The Martens Clause, 
Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of Public Conscience,’ American Journal of International Law, 94 
(2000) 78-89, pp.78 and 79; William Downey, ‘The Law of War and Military Necessity,’ American Journal 
of International Law, 47 (1953) pp.251-262.     
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‘relatively comprehensive agreement on the law of land warfare’,58 its provisions were not 
intended to be inclusive of all applicable law. Rather, the Martens Clause proscribes that ‘cases 
not included in the Regulations annexed to the Convention remain governed by customary 
international law relating to the conduct of warfare.’59 Consequently, this principle would be 
resoundingly reaffirmed in the 1949 Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners (GPW), the 1949 Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Times of War (GC IV), and the 1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949 (AP I).60   
 
The ‘Geneva Law’, as this postwar collective is sometimes referred to, dictates that the 
principles of humanitarian law are applicable to any conflict, even if a nation has clearly 
denounced the Conventions.61 Thus, Hague IV, which regulated land warfare during World War 
II, contained many of the fundamental precepts for modern international agreements.62 In effect, 
the Geneva Law ‘complemented and supplemented’ these already existing legal norms.63 
German officials, however, had a much different interpretation of the duties owed under Hague 
IV in the build-up to World War II.64 Although Germany signed and ratified the annexed 
Regulations, they maintained a specific reservation to Article 44.65    
 
Germany’s reservation to Hague IV should have served as a forewarning of events to come. 
Specifically, Article 44 states that a ‘belligerent is forbidden to force the inhabitants of territory 
occupied by it to furnish information about the army of the other belligerent, or about its means 
of self-defense.’66 Thus, Germany’s reservation to Hague IV could be viewed as evidence of the 
                                                          
58
 Roberts et al., Documents on the Laws of War p.68. See also Schmitt, ‘Military Necessity,’ p.797.   
59
 Roberts et al., Documents on the Laws of War p.68.    
60
 Roberts et al., Documents on the Laws of War p.68. See also Rupert Ticehurst, ‘The Martens Clause 
and the Laws of Armed Conflict,’ International Review of the Red Cross, 317 (1997) pp.125-134.   
61
 See Kalshoven, ‘Constraints,’ pp.53-54; see also Green, Law of Armed Conflict p.23.   
62
 Roberts et al., Documents on the Laws of War p.68. See also Schmitt, ‘Military Necessity,’ pp.807-811 
explaining the evolution of the law of war.   
63
 Roberts et al., Documents on the Laws of War p.68.     
64
 See The War Book of the German General Staff (McBride, Nast & Company, 1915), 
http://books.google.com/books?id=j3kDAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&ca
d=0#v=onepag&q&f=false providing a pre-World War II translation of the German War Manual. See also 
James Garner, ‘The German War Code,’ University of Illinois Bulletin, 15 (1918) pp.1, 9-10, and 20 
containing a complimentary analysis of the doctrine of Kriegsraison and its relation to Hague IV.    
65
 See Roberts et al., Documents on the Laws of War p.84. Germany signed the annexed Regulations of 
Hague IV on 18 October 1907 and subsequently ratified these provisions on 27 November 1909. At the 
time of signature they made note of their specific reservation and maintained this reservation until 
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country’s intention to not only invade neighbouring territory, but also gather information on a 
country’s military defences by forcing local inhabitants into collaboration.67 These facts become 
even more troubling when coupled with the doctrine of Kriegsraison geht vor Kriegsrecht, or as 
it is more commonly referred to, Kriegsraison.68 
 
Kriegsraison is a concept that first appeared in German literature in the late eighteenth 
century.69 The literal translation of this term is ‘military necessity in war overrides the law of 
war.’70 Accordingly, German proponents of the doctrine believed that ‘military necessity… 
renders inoperative ordinary law and the customs and usages of war’,71 Interestingly, this belief 
starkly contrasts with the contemporary law of war framework which recognizes that ‘necessity 
cannot overrule the law of war’.72 In fact, modern U.S. Army doctrine explains that ‘military 
necessity has been generally rejected as a defense for acts forbidden by the customary and 
conventional laws of war’.73 Of particular note, relevant law and custom are binding ‘not only 
upon states… but also upon individuals, and in particular, the members of their armed forces.’74 
 
Although Kriegsraison was overwhelmingly repudiated by the international community in the 
years following World War II, the facts and circumstances in Escape and Evasion Report No. 
866 strongly suggest that this doctrine was thriving amongst German forces in war-torn 
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France.75 While Kriegsraison allows a belligerent to violate rules of international law it deems 
‘necessary for the success of its military operations’,76 the underlying reasoning for this 
viewpoint is fundamentally flawed.77 As German forces in World War II were the sole judge of 
what constituted military necessity, the ‘doctrine [was] really that a belligerent may violate the 
law or repudiate it or ignore it whenever [it was] deemed to be for its military advantage.’78 Thus, 
Kriegsraison had no basis in fundamental principles of international law, but rather relied on a 
practitioner’s self-serving motivations and an innate ‘contempt’ for the established law of war.79  
 
3 The First to Leave the Ship 
At 1154 hours on 28 April 1944, two airmen in accompanying B-17s observed my grandfather’s 
aircraft leave formation with its ‘No. 3 engine on fire’.80 The weather conditions for the mission 
over Avord, France were relatively clear with only ‘slight ground haze… [and] scattered 
clouds.’81 Although this enabled the heavy bombers a great deal of visibility over their target, it 
also allowed German forces below to more effectively direct their anti-aircraft fire during this 
dangerous daytime mission. The first witness to the incident remembered seeing nine 
parachutes before his vision was obstructed by other planes in the formation.82 The second 
witness saw all 10 airmen bail out of the crippled aircraft before it exploded in mid-air.83  
 
My grandfather reported that his B-17 was ‘in pretty bad shape’ after receiving a direct hit 
immediately over its target.84 He had been wounded in both hands by exploding flak and 
observed a substantial amount of ‘fire on [the] wing’.85 The gas tank between the No. 3 and No. 
4 engine was in flames,86 which left the crew with little time to escape. My grandfather ‘was the 
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first to leave the ship’ and jumped from an altitude of approximately 15,000 feet.87 He delayed 
opening his parachute to avoid German flak and machine gun fire.88 Unfortunately, he waited 
too long and the resulting impact knocked him unconscious and fractured his back.89 Shortly 
thereafter, local Frenchmen picked him up and carried him into the woods where they gave him 
some ‘wine and a woodman’s jacket’ and ‘helped [him] the best they could.’90  
 
Although the pilot, Lt. James Cater, also escaped the crippled B-17, his exit from the nose hatch 
at 15,000 feet was less than ideal.91 He jumped with his hand on the ripcord, and accidently 
released his parachute while he was ‘still in the prop wash.’92 In all, Lt. Cater hung from his 
parachute harness, exposed to exploding flak, for nearly 18 minutes.93 During the final stage of 
his descent, he observed German ‘machine gun fire from the ground, directed at [him] and the 
other men.’94 Although he landed unharmed, he reported that other downed airmen were not so 
lucky. Lt. Cater recounted that ‘two men were said to be shot by German machine gun fire’ while 
trapped in their harnesses.95   
 
When interviewed by military intelligence officers after his escape, my grandfather was unsure 
of the fate of his fellow crewmembers.96 He reported seeing seven parachutes open during his 
rapid descent, and remarked that the bombardier was exiting the aircraft ‘at the moment’ the 
plane exploded.97 When asked during his debriefing, ‘what is [the] source’s opinion as to the 
fate of the other crew members’, my grandfather’s answer revealed the hopelessness he must 
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have felt.98 Lt. Murphy responded matter-of-factly that all men were ‘believed to be prisoners or 
dead - no one [else] contacted the resistance.’99 
 
While my grandfather’s predicament must have seemed quite desperate, he was fortunate to 
have survived such a harrowing experience. As he rightfully noted, he had not been killed during 
his escape nor had he been captured as a prisoner of war. Most importantly, the delayed 
release of his parachute had saved him from the indiscriminate machine gun fire directed at his 
crew while they hung defenceless from their parachutes. While such conduct on the part of 
German forces certainly seems less than chivalrous, it is also notable for another reason. It 
evidences a clear disregard for the laws and customs of war.  
 
As a matter of course, ‘the belligerents in both World Wars accepted the 1907 [Hague] 
Conventions as governing their activities’.100 Although Hague IV provides limited guidance 
related to the targeting of defenceless airmen, it is notable that the annexed Regulations make 
reference to the use of ‘balloons’ and ‘appliances in the air’ during times of war.101 Thus, while 
Hague IV’s provisions were intended to apply to land warfare rather than aerial warfare, one 
could infer that it is often quite difficult to ascertain where one type of conflict ends and the other 
begins. This distinction is especially complicated when discussing the duty owed to those who 
have successfully parachuted to the earth after their aircraft has been destroyed. 
 
While Hague IV contains guidelines related to the treatment and care of prisoners of war,102 my 
grandfather’s situation was not directly analogous to that of a captured prisoner. Rather, he was 
a combatant who had successfully escaped his stricken aircraft and had not yet been given the 
opportunity to surrender. He was admittedly unarmed and was effectively incapacitated at the 
time of his landing.103 Despite the fact that Germany maintained a reservation to Article 44 of the 
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annexed Regulations, they were bound by all other duties imposed by Hague IV when dealing 
with U.S. airmen.104 In particular, Article 23 imposes a specific prohibition on killing or wounding 
an enemy ‘who, having laid down his arms, or having no longer means of defence, has 
surrendered at [his] discretion’.105   
 
In addition, German soldiers were constrained by the rules of customary international law 
articulated in the 1923 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare.106 Although these draft rules were never 
adopted as legally binding, ‘they were regarded as an authoritative attempt to clarify and 
formulate rules of air warfare, and largely corresponded to [established] customary rules and 
general principles’.107 As evidence of their applicability during World War II, ‘both Axis and Allied 
powers proclaimed their adherence to the [Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare] and made 
accusations of their violation.’108 Specifically, Article 20 expressly forbids the type of misconduct 
witnessed by my grandfather and his crew.109 It states, ‘when an aircraft has been disabled, the 
occupants when endeavoring to escape by means of parachute must not be attacked in the 
course of their descent.’110  
 
Under the modern law of war, there is still no ‘formally binding agreement which exclusively 
addresses air warfare.’111 As if to emphasize the importance of the 1923 Hague Rules of Aerial 
Warfare, however, a number of its principles are reiterated in modern provisions of international 
law.112 Notably, GPW formally recognizes the concept of combatant immunity113 which is further 
articulated in contemporary U.S. jurisprudence.114 In recent times, combatant immunity has 
come to signify ‘a doctrine rooted in the customary international law of war, [which] forbids 
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prosecution of soldiers for their lawful belligerent acts committed during the course of armed 
conflicts against legitimate military targets.’115   
 
Furthermore AP I, which has not been adopted by the United States but has come to represent 
persuasive customary international law,116 provides unambiguous protections for escaping 
parachutists. Specifically, AP I forbids the targeting of a ‘person parachuting from an aircraft in 
distress’ and further requires that a downed airman ‘be given an opportunity to surrender before 
being made the object of attack’.117 Thus, it is ‘generally considered a rule of customary 
international law that an aircrew baling out of a damaged aircraft are hors de combat and 
immune from attack whether by enemy aircraft or from the ground.’118 In addition, once an 
airman reaches the ground he shall not be made the object of attack if ‘he has been rendered 
unconscious or is otherwise incapacitated by wounds or sickness, and therefore is incapable of 
defending himself’.119   
 
Thus, the conduct of German forces described by both my grandfather and the pilot of his B-17 
constituted violations of the laws and customs of war. Despite the fact that Hague IV contained 
no specific prohibition on the targeting of downed airmen descending from their crippled aircraft, 
these actions were strictly forbidden by established customary international law. In addition, it is 
unclear how such behaviour could be justified under the doctrines of Kriegsraison or military 
necessity. Certainly, killing unarmed and incapacitated airmen is not indispensable for military 
success. Rather, it signifies a gross repudiation of the laws of war and an overall contempt for 
the humanitarian principles embodied in Hague IV.      
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4 Successful Escape and Evasion 
While Lt. Murphy was certainly fortunate to have escaped the fate of some of his fellow airmen 
at the hands of the Germans, his adventure was far from over. For the next three months he 
would be forced to evade capture by enemy soldiers and la Milice Française, local French 
militias loyal to occupying German forces.120 My grandfather had been trained in escape and 
evasion in February of 1944 by an Intelligence Officer in England and he found the lectures to 
be of significant value.121 As revealed in Escape and Evasion Report No. 866, he took his duties 
very seriously. When asked about the destruction of ‘secret papers and equipment’, my 
grandfather responded in partially capitalized letters, ‘I ATE them’, as if to emphasize his 
resolve.122    
 
In order for my grandfather to escape detection by German soldiers, it was necessary for him to 
blend in with the civilian population. He was lucky that the Frenchmen who initially found him 
saw fit to place a ‘woodman’s jacket’ over his shoulders.123 Although my grandfather could 
barely walk because of the back injury he sustained during his landing, the jacket provided a 
much needed disguise.124 He remarked: 
I started S by compass. Shortly after I started out, and while I was talking to 
some Frenchmen, three truckloads of Germans drove by, evidently searching for 
me. They paid no attention to me while the Frenchmen said ‘Bonjour’ to them…  
[Subsequently] I kept well off the roads and stayed in the woods as much as 
possible.125 
Throughout my grandfather’s escape, German soldiers were in close pursuit. He was told by 
resistance fighters that the ‘Germans formed a circle from Avord and followed him as far as [the 
town of] Blet.’126 This was a distance of nearly 20 kilometres. At one point, ‘they were just three 
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or four kilometers behind; one town they entered about four hours after [he] had left it.’127 My 
grandfather, however, had discovered a creative means of transportation in light of his injuries. 
He observed that ‘bicycling seemed to be quite safe as long as one ducked for cars.’128  
 
Following the D-Day invasion of 6 June 1944, travel became increasingly difficult.129 My 
grandfather noted that German military operations were intensifying as a result of the Allied 
landing, and the ‘Gestapo ran patrols on the main roads, using chiefly motor cars.’130 In addition, 
the Germans did away with all ‘through trains in France’ and transportation was limited to only 
those rail cars running east or northeast towards the German border.131 In the meantime, 
however, my grandfather had been fortunate to come across a French family that put him in 
direct contact with le Maquis.132 
 
After contacting the French Resistance, Lt. Murphy was moved to the farm of a local resistance 
leader, Monsieur Camille Gerbeau.133 At this point in his journey, my grandfather seemed less 
concerned with affecting his own escape and instead turned his attention towards assisting the 
nearly 575 men training at this ‘center of resistance activities.’134 He was introduced to the grand 
chef de resistance, and ‘participated in the parachuting [of resistance forces] and in their radio 
work, decoding messages as they instructed [him].’135 
 
As a result of his actions, my grandfather was now acting in concert with le Maquis and aiding 
their efforts as if he was a fellow resistance fighter rather than a downed U.S. airman. He writes 
that he was ‘sending out regular messages’136 to Allied forces and was also relaying information 
related to German ‘V-1’ and ‘V-2’ weapons.137 When he was finally rescued by the British Royal 
Air Force on 5 August 1944, he was fully immersed in the culture of the resistance fighter. As 
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evidenced in Escape and Evasion Report No. 866, my grandfather often used the term ‘we’ to 
describe the efforts of le Maquis against the occupying German forces.138 Thus, on 4 August 
1944, he recalls that ‘we got our operational messages over the BBC… that night we went to 
the [meeting location], armed with MG’s [machine guns] and psitols [sic].’139  
 
Finally, more than three months after his plane was shot down over Avord, Lt. Murphy’s long 
awaited salvation arrived.140 Although my grandfather returned to England on 6 August 1944 
after a daring Royal Air Force rescue,141 the danger he faced in occupied France is even more 
significant when analysed from a law of war perspective. Prior to World War II, parties to a 
conflict presupposed that treaty obligations applied only to international armed conflicts or 
conflicts between states.142 Notably, Hague IV and its annexed Regulations refer exclusively to 
‘conflicts between nations’.143  
 
As demonstrated by my grandfather’s narrative, however, the conflict in German occupied 
France was extremely complex.144 It had both the characteristics of an inter-state and intra-state 
conflict.145 While German soldiers were forced to defend against aerial bombardment from 
traditional military forces stationed outside of German occupied territory, internal resistance 
fighters such as le Maquis were actively challenging German control from within.146   
 
The multifaceted nature of this conflict allowed escaping combatants to more easily blend in 
with sympathetic members of the local French population in order to avoid capture.147 Although 
my grandfather deliberately disguised himself in civilian clothing to avoid detection, his 
interactions with le Maquis appear to go well beyond that of a typical downed airman. As a 
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result, he could no longer be considered as merely an escaping combatant. Rather, his activities 
are more accurately described as being analogous to that of a spy or saboteur.148   
 
The term ‘spy’, as it is generally understood under Hague IV, refers to a person who ‘collects 
information clandestinely behind enemy lines while wearing civilian clothing.’149 Specifically, a 
person is considered a spy when ‘he obtains or endeavors to obtain information in the zone of 
operations of a belligerent, with the intention of communicating it to [a] hostile party.’150 While 
my grandfather provided valuable assistance to the French Resistance, such activities were 
likely conducted with substantial risk to his well-being. 
 
Hague IV makes a clear distinction between soldiers ‘carrying out their missions openly’ and 
those seeking to conceal their identities by removing their uniforms.151 In addition, the 1923 
Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare requires members of the crew of a military aircraft to wear a 
‘distinctive emblem… should they become separated from their aircraft.’152 Generally, ‘any 
person who collects information while in uniform retains his status as a combatant… and if 
captured is to be treated as a prisoner of war’.153 In contrast, spies and saboteurs do not enjoy 
protected status when captured by enemy forces.154 Rather, they may be tried and sentenced to 
death for their actions.155 
 
In contemporary conflicts, AP I provides that, as a matter of customary international law, 
‘combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they are 
engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack.’156 Therefore, it would 
be contrary to the modern law of war for a combatant to disguise himself as a civilian while 
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openly taking part in hostilities. AP I recognizes, however, ‘that there are situations in armed 
conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish 
himself’.157 All that is required in these instances is that an individual ‘carry his arms openly’.158 
A combatant that is captured by an enemy while refusing to comply with these provisions 
effectively ‘forfeit[s] his right to be a prisoner of war’.159   
 
Therefore, under the law of war as it existed in 1944 and in modern treaty provisions, it is highly 
advisable that ‘members of the armed forces engaged in the collecting of information or 
sabotage in enemy-occupied territory should, whenever possible, wear [a] uniform.’160 To do 
otherwise would run the risk of being treated as a spy if captured. Given the remainder of the 
discussion contained in this article, it seems likely that my grandfather would have been put to 
death without the benefit of a trial had he been captured while assisting le Maquis. In fact, Adolf 
Hitler had issued an order in 1942 calling for the immediate execution of Allied parachutists as a 
matter of military necessity.161 Thus, like many downed airmen and French resistance fighters 
who met their fate, my grandfather’s death might have served as yet another example of 
Germany’s violent occupation.    
 
5 The Horrors of War and Germany’s Violent Occupation 
Lt. Murphy survived the harrowing experience of parachuting from his stricken B-17 and 
subsequently evading capture. Specific details of his declassified account, however, reveal that 
he was unprepared for the horrific nature of land warfare.162 As described in the remainder of 
Escape and Evasion Report No. 866, the conduct of German soldiers was not only contrary to 
the law of war as it existed in the summer of 1944, it was also morally reprehensible.163   
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Within the first two days of his attempted escape, my grandfather learned that survival was 
going to be a daily struggle. He slept in the woods at night and nearly froze to death.164 He 
quickly exhausted the meagre supplies in his survival pack and had no food or water.165 As a 
result, he had to approach sympathetic civilians for assistance.166 One of the few facts my father 
and I knew about my grandfather was that the man was a devout Catholic. Thus, it must have 
seemed like divine providence when in those first few days he was directed to a Catholic Priest 
for assistance.167   
 
Although my grandfather spoke no French, local inhabitants likely realized his religious 
preference from the engravings on his dog tags.168 They gave him a letter and pointed him 
toward a nearby village.169 He circled the small town at first, looking for signs of German patrols, 
and then proceeded directly to the church as he had been instructed.170 When the Priest 
appeared at the door, my grandfather handed him the note and pleaded for assistance.171 The 
Priest responded almost immediately with one simple phrase - ‘Au revoir’.172 Like most of the 
civilian population, this man of faith was likely frightened by the threat of retribution. 
 
German forces had increased patrols because they knew ‘Americans were in the region’.173 In 
addition, la Milice Française was terrorizing the countryside at the behest of its German 
occupiers.174 With few options, my grandfather slept on the bare earth and later concealed 
himself amongst horses in local stables.175 He even hid in one family’s ‘WC’, or outhouse, on 6 
June 1944, the day the Normandy landings took place.176 His daily existence was fraught with 
peril, and during this time, German soldiers monitored all radio transmissions in the region.177 As 
a result, a number of French operatives were captured after they signalled my grandfather’s 
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position to Allied troops.178 One man who narrowly escaped had ‘literally been beaten half to 
death’ during the incident.179  
 
Being taken into custody by German forces or la Milice Française meant certain death for many 
members of le Maquis.180 While staying at Monsieur Gerbeau’s farm, my grandfather met a ‘tall 
very good looking young captain in the French Intelligence Service, Jean, who had arrived with 
a short very heavily bearded chap… having parachuted into France.’181 These men came to 
meet with the grand chef de resistance and assist training operations at the farm.182 
Unfortunately, both men were captured and subsequently brutalized by German forces.183 Jean, 
the tall good looking captain, was tortured.184 His companion, the ‘bearded chap’, was 
summarily murdered.185 
 
Although these events are alarming, they represent only a hint of the true horror my grandfather 
witnessed. German soldiers throughout France used violence as a tool of occupation.186 
Furthermore, they were capable of far more egregious conduct than merely murdering local 
resistance fighters. While the deaths of members of le Maquis were certainly tragic, there is one 
particular recollection contained in Escape and Evasion Report No. 866 that defies all 
explanation.187 It can only be described as a grotesque and appalling perversion of war. In a 
handwritten note scrawled in the margin of the report, my grandfather attests to having 
witnessed a shameful atrocity committed against the French population.188 In his own voice, he 
painfully recalls:  
About 3 weeks ago I saw a town within 4 hours bicycle ride up the Gerbeau farm 
where some 500 men, women, and children had been murdered by the 
Germans. I saw one baby who had been crucified.189  
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There is no question that the event described by Lt. Murphy signifies a complete abandonment 
of the laws and customs of war. Readers of his words, even 69 years after they were first 
transcribed, cannot help but succumb to the powerful and deplorable imagery they invoke. Such 
conduct seemingly transcends all conscionable bounds of cruelty. Furthermore, it suggests a 
gross repudiation of every principle of human decency. While the men who committed these 
crimes likely justified their behaviour under the doctrine of Kriegsraison, the genuine rationale 
behind their conduct may be far simpler to explain. German soldiers were attempting to terrorize 
French civilians into submission.190 In effect, they were acting out of desperation as the War 
slowly slipped from their grasp.191   
 
Despite the shocking content of this revelation, it is initially unclear whether the full significance 
of my grandfather’s addendum was recognized by military intelligence officers overseeing his 
debriefing. As a practical matter, this hastily transcribed addition was not included in the final, 
typed version of the report.192 The officer charged with conducting my grandfather’s interview 
also failed to record any other information related to this grisly remembrance.193 Rather, he 
seemed far more concerned with discussing German tactical movements and troop 
concentrations - the precise type of information that escape and evasion reports were intended 
to collect. Thus, it seems possible this classified postscript, which was unavailable for public 
scrutiny, went unnoticed by the approving official and the Army chain of command due to its 
nearly indecipherable penmanship.      
 
By the time this document was first declassified in 1974, nearly 30 years had passed since the 
end of the War and four years since my grandfather’s death.194 In addition, the war crime trials 
at Nuremberg and other related war crimes proceedings had concluded over 25 years prior. 
During this intervening period, my grandfather was prohibited from openly discussing the 
particular facts of his wartime experience because of the security certificate he signed in 
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1944.195 Moreover, it seems likely that he found it difficult to speak about such hellish 
recollections. In subsequently contacting members of the Murphy family, it was clear they had 
no knowledge of this report or the incident described therein. As a result, it has yet to be 
determined whether this long-faded and nearly forgotten attestation represents undiscovered 
evidence of a terrible criminal act perpetrated against the French population.196   
 
One can only imagine how this experience affected my grandfather, a religious man forced to 
observe this scene of extreme malice. These memories likely haunted him for the remainder of 
his life. While German soldiers had demonstrated little regard for the law of war, nothing could 
prepare an individual for the horrific image of a crucified child. In addition, there is no feasible 
justification for why these activities would have been necessary for military success. Rather, 
such misconduct suggests an innate contempt for all humanitarian duties imposed under 
international law.  
 
This event demonstrates an absolute disregard for the ‘high ideals’ expressed in the Preamble 
to Hague IV.197 Moreover, it represents multiple violations of the Articles contained in the 
annexed Regulations.198 During World War II, there was ‘no special provision in the law of 
armed conflict concerning the treatment of the civilian population in territory controlled by a 
belligerent… although atrocities against the civilian population of the adverse party would 
amount to war crimes.’199 Rather, the duties inherent to belligerent occupation were expressed 
by a host of provisions in Hague IV.200   
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Generally, Hague IV’s annexed Regulations ‘proscribe the rules of conduct and the limitations 
imposed upon the occupant on behalf of the inhabitants of the territory in question’.201 Article 43 
dictates that “the authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the 
occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as 
possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in 
force in the country.202 Notably, the conduct described in Escape and Evasion Report No. 866 
seems to embody the antithesis of protecting public order and safety.203 
 
The concept of distinction, which was first articulated in Article 25, requires that parties to a 
conflict distinguish at all times between combatants and peaceful civilians.204 This provision 
effectively precludes ‘the attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, 
dwellings, or buildings which are undefended.’205 Articles 22 and 23(e) of the annexed 
Regulations prohibit the infliction of ‘unnecessary suffering’ and ‘superfluous injury’ during 
hostilities.206 As noted, ‘the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not 
unlimited.’207 In addition, Article 50 declares that ‘no general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, 
shall be inflicted upon the population on account of the acts of individuals for which they cannot 
be regarded as jointly and severally liable.’208 Thus, collective punishment of the civilian 
population is forbidden.209 
 
World War II was ‘catastrophic for many civilian populations, especially those in besieged and 
bombarded cities, and in occupied territories.’210 At the end of hostilities, however, ‘there was 
broad international acceptance of the need to adopt an international agreement for the 
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protection of civilians’.211 As a result, GC IV was the ‘first treaty devoted exclusively to the 
protection of civilians in time of war.’212 Article 3 of GC IV reemphasizes the humanitarian 
principles outlined in the Martens Clause when it requires that ‘persons taking no active part in 
the hostilities… shall in all circumstances be treated humanely.’213 Furthermore, Article 4 
introduces the term ‘protected persons’ which is defined as ‘those who, at a given moment and 
in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a 
party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.’214  
 
In contemporary conflicts, GC IV requires that certain common protections be applied to 
protected persons, in particular women and children.215 For example, ‘protected persons are 
entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their 
religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs... [t]hey shall at all times be 
humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence’.216 Article 32 of 
GC IV also forbids ‘physical suffering or extermination of protected persons… [t]his prohibition 
applies not only to murder, torture, corporal punishment, mutilation… but also to any other 
measures of brutality whether applied by civilian or military agents.’217   
 
In addition, GC IV’s provisions have been heavily supplemented by AP I which deals with the 
protection of civilian persons during times of war.218 Notably, Article 35 of AP I reiterates Hague 
IV’s prohibition on superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering.219 Moreover, Article 51 states 
that the ‘civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against 
dangers arising from military operations… [they] shall not be the object of attack.’220 Thus, ‘acts 
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or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian 
population’ are expressly prohibited.221   
 
As such, there is little question that the event described in Escape and Evasion Report No. 866 
constitutes a gross violation of both the historical and contemporary laws of war. In addition, this 
incident signifies a repudiation of the humanitarian principles outlined in the Preamble to Hague 
IV and in relevant customary international law. Despite Germany’s reliance on the doctrine of 
Kriegsraison, there was no general exception to applicable treaty provisions which allowed for 
indiscriminate attacks and infliction of unnecessary suffering based upon military necessity.222 
Rather, the event described by my grandfather should have been characterized as an egregious 
war crime and punished accordingly.  
 
Conclusion 
The study of declassified intelligence has the potential to reshape modern conceptions of 
history. In particular, World War II era records provide valuable insight into ‘aspects of German 
behavior, and thus of Western European culture in the first half of the twentieth century.’223 As 
German forces swept across Europe, Nazi leaders worried ‘that “weaker” contemporaries and 
subsequent generations might not understand the “necessity” of their actions’.224 Thus, they 
attempted to conceal not only the corpses of their victims but also the homicidal policies 
underlying their wartime indiscretions.225 At the conclusion of this great conflict, thousands of 
war criminals escaped prosecution due in part to an ‘intelligence failure’ by Allied forces.226 
Scholars acknowledge that ‘this failure had less to do with collecting information than with 
recognizing its significance.’227 
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Socio-legal methods have a tendency to reveal alternative viewpoints or reconstructions of 
historical events.228 As Salter notes, ‘no single and supposedly self-sufficient academic 
discipline can ever be adequate to any research topic’.229 Thus, proponents of this 
interdisciplinary approach understand that ‘history is a work in progress’.230 They appreciate that 
by elevating the experience of the individual above the collective, researchers are able to 
challenge the assumptions of traditional historians. When ordinary soldiers ‘include personal 
comments in their correspondence, or write in pencil on the margins of reports… [t]hey are not 
writing diaries for posterity.’231 Rather, these historical witnesses are ‘writing in the moment to 
satisfy military requirements.’232 As a result, their words should be afforded additional deference 
by virtue of their having experienced these events first-hand.233 
 
Unfortunately, modern war crimes scholarship is often dominated by ‘pessimism, disapproval, 
and critique’.234 This environment of negativity has led some to reject the study of declassified 
intelligence, and by implication socio-legal analysis, as a ‘naive search for heroes’.235 Such 
academic detachment ignores ‘the possibility of alternative histories… [as well as] a broader 
understanding and recognition of the personal roles of individuals’.236 Moreover, it marginalizes 
the voices of victims whose stories have yet to be told.237 Most scholars fail to understand that 
only by questioning established orthodoxy can we truly ‘expose and destabilize claims to the 
authority of objectivity.’238 Thus, ‘our best hope of completing this complex mosaic… are 
aggressive and inquisitive historians who believe that there are no real secrets’.239 
 
Although critics of this article will contend that numerous treatises have dealt with German 
atrocities committed during the War, there is one important distinction that must be made. As 
with any historical research, it is often difficult to shift from a theoretical analysis of events to a 
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precise study of ‘temporal and geographic locations’.240 Thus, I went to great lengths to 
determine the accuracy of the information contained in my grandfather’s report. In October of 
2011, I travelled to the Cher region of France. More importantly, I was accompanied by a 
remarkable historical witness, Tech Sergeant Clement Dowler, the 87 year old ball turret gunner 
from my grandfather’s fateful flight.241   
 
Mr. Dowler and I saw many memorable things as we retraced my grandfather’s journey south 
through the French cities of Avord, Bourges, Sancoins, and Sagonne. Thanks to the generosity 
of the French Air Force, we gazed out upon the old runway of the Avord Airbase where Mr. 
Dowler fractured his leg during a rough parachute landing on the afternoon of 28 April 1944. We 
also visited with the wonderful townspeople of the region who sheltered my grandfather and still 
referred to him as the ‘géant américain’ due to his surprising height.242 In addition, historians 
associated with le Musée de la Résistance in Bourges introduced us to extraordinary men who 
served with le Maquis during this tumultuous period in French history.243    
 
Of particular note, not one of the individuals present - scholar, resistance fighter, or Mr. Dowler 
himself - could state with certainty where the dreadful event described by my grandfather 
occurred. In subsequent correspondence, a historian in the region, Frederic Henoff, described 
the difficulties he encountered during his search for related information: 
Regarding your grandfather’s [Escape and Evasion Report], I had also read this 
handwritten note. When he was hidden at Mr. Gerbeau farm [sic], at the time of 
the Normandy landing, a city not far from there - Saint-Amand-Montrond - was for 
a short time a place of fights between the French underground and the 
Germans... But we don’t know [the whole] story, and perhaps your grandfather 
saw things which were forgotten then in the storm of the following fights, at the 
time of the liberation of the area.      
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The scale of the carnage described in Escape and Evasion Report No. 866 strongly suggests 
that my grandfather bore witness to the aftermath of the massacre at Oradour-sur-Glane.244 This 
infamous mass murder represents one of the most disgraceful wartime atrocities committed by 
German forces in occupied France. Moreover, he may have been recalling the fighting that took 
place in Saint-Amand-Montrond, or events that transpired in another nearby village, as Mr. 
Henoff maintains. It is clear that Lt. Murphy travelled through this region, and he likely 
overestimated the number of victims he observed. Nonetheless, there is one other alternative 
that has significant historical and moral implications - no matter how improbable it may seem, 
this declassified intelligence report could contain evidence of an undocumented German war 
crime. 
 
Criminal acts were witnessed by many, including Mr. Dowler, during his five month escape from 
German occupied France. Despite this fact, the victims described in my grandfather’s report are 
no less deserving of justice than the millions of innocents who suffered during this brutal conflict. 
At the conclusion of hostilities in World War II, it was widely acknowledged that the ‘Germans 
had ill-treated and in many cases executed Allied personnel belonging to both regular and 
resistance forces, as well as civilians… in occupied territories.’245 As a result of Germany’s 
disregard for the tenets of humanitarian law, the Nuremberg Tribunal was established pursuant 
to the London Charter of 1945 for the purpose of securing ‘just and prompt trial and punishment 
of the major war criminals of the European Axis.’246  
 
The London Charter was notable in that it first provided a clear definition of what constituted a 
war crime for the purpose of the ensuing proceedings.247 The principles established in the 
Charter and in the Nuremberg Tribunal’s resulting judgment would come to be regarded as 
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declaratory of the law of war.248 The term ‘war crime’ was given broad application in the 
proceedings and included conduct that evidenced ‘violations of the laws and customs of war.’249 
In addition, the Charter introduced a new subset of war crimes described as crimes against 
humanity.250 This designation included such transgressions as ‘murder, extermination, 
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian 
population’.251 
 
Interestingly, the Nuremberg Tribunal gave little credence to the use of military necessity as a 
defence to German war crimes.252 Many felt that by distorting this concept, German soldiers 
reduced ‘the entire body of the laws of war to a code of military convenience, having no further 
sanction than the sense of honour of the individual military commander’.253 Thus, within the 
guidelines set forth by the Nuremberg Tribunal, my grandfather’s account unequivocally 
demonstrates that Kriegsraison is both morally reprehensible and criminal. In effect, this 
doctrine allows a belligerent to justify even the most abhorrent behaviour under the guise of 
military necessity. Consequently, it serves as nothing more than a means of enabling wartime 
misconduct.  
 
While the Nuremberg Tribunal is now a fixture of the past, the majority of German war criminals 
were tried by national courts.254 This trend continues to the present day.255 One only has to look 
to the May 2011 conviction of a former guard at a Nazi concentration camp to see the utility of 
this forum for prosecuting war crimes which occurred many years ago.256 Although my initial 
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intent in writing this article was to pay tribute to Lt. Murphy’s bravery and sacrifice, my thoughts 
often turned to the innocent French civilians whose lives were extinguished in the summer of 
1944. I pondered whether the perpetrators of this vicious crime were punished and whether the 
true extent of their acts had been exposed to the world.   
 
As a result, my final conclusion related to Escape and Evasion Report No. 866 is that the facts 
outlined in this document simply demand further scrutiny. In essence, this article is a humble 
appeal for renewed investigation of this historical evidence. National courts still provide a 
feasible venue for determining culpability should my grandfather’s report lead to evidence that is 
more substantial in nature. Furthermore, the Nuremberg Tribunal did not place a statute of 
limitations on war crimes or crimes against humanity, nor should the French government.257   
 
Thus, even though my grandfather passed away over 40 years ago, his story could finally bring 
justice for the men, women, and children who suffered unlawful deaths at the hands of their 
German occupiers. Although I never had the pleasure of meeting Lt. Murphy, I strongly suspect 
that he, and the honourable men that fought alongside him, would have wanted it that way. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
After decades of legal proceedings, Demjanjuk’s conviction was hailed by many as evidence of the 
immutability of justice.   
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